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Colorado’s Rollout of Legal 
Marijuana Is Succeeding: A 
Report on the State’s 
Implementation of Legalization 
John Hudak† 
Abstract 
In November 2012, Colorado voters approved Amendment Sixty-
Four to the state constitution, allowing for cultivation, processing, 
and sale of recreational marijuana. The move was unprecedented by 
any state, national, or international standards, and in the months 
following, the state began the tremendous task of implementing the 
voters’ will. This required statutory, regulatory, and other changes 
that would construct and govern a market for cannabis products. 
With no true model to guide Colorado, the state ultimately moved 
forward. This Article describes the challenges the state faced in this 
effort, how it overcame those challenges, and what level of success 
Colorado has had in dealing with legal marijuana. In the process, this 
Article walks through the broad framework of the regulatory state 
and explains why and to what effect the state has achieved its goals. 
Overall, Colorado has been broadly successful in implementing 
Amendment Sixty-Four and bringing legal marijuana to the Cen-
tennial State. However, the process has not been perfect, as state 
regulators and officials still face challenges in this new area of public 
policy. 
 
† Fellow, Center for Effective Public Management, Managing Editor, 
FixGov Blog, The Brookings Institution. Prior to joining Brookings, 
John served as the program director and as a graduate fellow at the 
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. He holds a B.A. in 
political science and economics from the University of Connecticut and 
an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Vanderbilt University. 
Portions of this Article were originally published in John Hudak, 
Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding: A Report on the 
State’s Implementation of Legislation, Brookings Inst. (2014).  
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Introduction1 
In November 2012, Colorado voters decided to experiment with 
marijuana. Formally, they approved Amendment Sixty-Four, modify-
ing the state constitution.2 This move was historic and did something, 
which, to that point, no other state—or modern foreign government—
had ever done: legalize retail (recreational) marijuana.  
As part of the amendment, the state was required to construct 
legal, regulatory, and tax frameworks that would allow businesses to 
cultivate, process, and sell marijuana not simply to medical patients—
as had been happening in Colorado for more than a decade—but to 
anyone twenty-one and older. This change came despite existing fed-
eral prohibition of marijuana and opposition from the governor, state 
attorney general, many mayors, and the law enforcement community. 
At its heart, this Article is about good government and does not 
take a position on whether the legalization of retail marijuana was the 
correct decision. Instead, it takes for granted that Amendment Sixty-
Four and its progeny are the law and should be implemented success-
fully, per voters’ wishes. The Article examines what the state has 
done well and what it has not. It delves into why and how regulatory 
and administrative changes were made. Finally, it offers an evaluation 
of how effective the implementation has been. Key findings include 
the following: 
 It is too early to judge the success of Colorado’s policy, but it 
is not too early to say that the rollout—initial implementation—
of legal retail marijuana has been largely successful. 
 The state has met challenging statutory and constitutional 
deadlines for the construction and launch of a legal, regulatory, 
and tax apparatus for its new policy. In doing so, it made intel-
ligent decisions about regulatory needs, structure of distribution, 
prevention of illegal diversion, and other vital aspects of its new 
market. It made those decisions in concert with a wide variety of 
stakeholders in the state.  
 Colorado’s strong rollout is attributable to a number of ele-
ments. Those include (1) the leadership by state officials; (2) a  
1. I would like to thank the numerous individuals in Colorado and 
Washington, DC, who made themselves available for interviews for this 
research. I would also like to thank Jonathan Rauch, John Walsh, Beth 
Stone, and Christine Jacobs for feedback on this report. Finally, I have 
to acknowledge excellent research assistance from Grace Wallack, 
Ashley Gabriele, Charlie Dorison, Jared Milfred, MaryCate Most, and 
Conor Sullivan. A previous version of this report appeared on the 
Brookings Institution website.  
2. Amendment Sixty-Four was relabeled when placed in the Colorado Con-
stitution. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16.  
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cooperative, inclusive approach centering on task forces and 
working groups; (3) substantial efforts to improve administrative 
communication; (4) adaptive regulation that embraces regulatory 
lookback and process-oriented learning; (5) reorganizing, rebuild-
ing, and restaffing critical state regulatory institutions; (6) and 
changes in culture in state and local government, among interest 
groups, and among the public. 
 Regulations address key concerns such as diversion, shirking, 
communication breakdowns, illegal activity, and the financial 
challenges facing the marijuana industry. However, some regula-
tions were also intended to help regulators, as they endure rapid, 
on-the-job training in dealing with legal marijuana.  
 Despite real success, challenges involving edibles, homegrown 
marijuana, tax incentives, and marijuana tourism remain, and 
the state must address them in a more effective way. 
Recent failures at the federal level show Americans daily what 
happens when a government refuses to govern and is unwilling or 
unable to make changes in the face of policy realities. Colorado made 
a conscious effort to preserve enough flexibility to be effective over 
time. A strong rollout is important, but what happens after the roll-
out is just as important. With its emphasis on flexibility, Colorado 
took out an insurance policy against unintended consequences. 
I. Why Implementation Matters 
In any policy area, the implementation of laws and regulations is 
essential for administration and governance. Legalized marijuana in 
Colorado is no different. In fact, this specific policy area is unique in 
many ways that make attention to implementation all the more 
important. 
General Implementation Demands 
The implementation of any policy is critical. Government failures 
are expensive, create market uncertainty, lower the morale of person-
nel, create inter- and intra-agency management problems, and cause 
costly public and political embarrassment. High-profile implementa-
tion failures, such as the rollout of the Affordable Care Act’s federal 
exchange website, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
response to Hurricane Katrina, or the management of the Vietnam 
War are ingrained in the minds of many Americans. In each of those 
cases, public officials faced tremendous backlash.  
Implementation matters for more than headlines and political 
costs. The launch of any new program is often its most risky period. 
Failure rates can be high; politicians’ patience can be limited; public 
skepticism is often substantial. Narratives about success or failure—
regardless of the realities of administration—can take root and have 
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dramatic effects on public and political support. This incubation per-
iod for public policies can lead to rapid reversal, as was seen in the 
1980s after Congress passed the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act 
of 1988.3  
Moreover, early implementation decisions are often the most im-
portant. The way in which a program is initially designed and exe-
cuted will shape its subsequent development. Because of bureaucratic 
inertia and political entrenchment, righting the ship is often difficult 
after setting a wayward course.  
For legalized marijuana, successful implementation matters for 
other, unique reasons. First, Colorado’s experiment raises unusual 
federalism issues. While marijuana cultivation, distribution, possess-
ion, and use are legal in Colorado, all those activities violate numer-
ous federal laws and regulations.4 In response, the Justice Department 
issued a memo in August 2013 (referred to as the “Cole Memo”) that 
clarified federal government priorities in this area.5 The memo says 
that the federal government expects states that “endeavor to author-
ize marijuana production, distribution, and possession . . . will imple-
ment strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems that 
will address the threat those state laws could pose to public safety, 
public health, and other law enforcement interests.”6 
The federal government, in the context of Justice Department 
enforcement, will take a hands-off approach to the enforcement of the 
Controlled Substances Act and other statutory and regulatory prohi-
bitions if, and only if, states implement regulations effectively and 
comprehensively. Subpar implementation poses a risk that the federal 
government can step in, in a variety of ways, and shut down legalized 
marijuana in the state.  
Beyond the federal question, Colorado’s implementation efforts 
have consequences for other states. Public opinion is changing,7 and 
 
3. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 
Stat. 683 (1988) (repealed 1989). For a brief description of the Act, see 
Why Was the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 1988 
Repealed in 1989?, The Medicare Newsgroup (last visited Jan. 27, 
2015), http://www.medicarenewsgroup.com/news/medicare-faqs/individ 
ual-faq?faqId=9afa2890-81dd-4620-b7ed-329162f5d88b.  
4. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841 (2012) (classifying marijuana as a schedule 1 
 substance and setting penalties for its possession).  
5. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. 
Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) (on 
file with Case Western Reserve Law Review), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.  
6. Id. at 2. 
7. See, e.g., William A. Galston & E.J. Dionne Jr., The New Politics of 
Marijuana Legalization: Why Opinion Is Changing, The Brookings 
Inst. (May 29, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/
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public policy is moving toward legalization, but many states are 
waiting to see what the experience in Colorado will be.8 If the Colo-
rado model is a success, other states that consider retail legalization 
measures may well model their own legal and regulatory systems on 
Colorado’s. Failure in Colorado will either deter states from legalizing 
or force them to chart a very different path in administering legaliza-
tion policy.  
In short, Colorado’s early implementation decisions will be consid-
ered the Colorado Model—a model that will inform and influence 
marijuana policy, potentially, for years to come. 
II. What Is a “Successful” Implementation? 
In the context of marijuana policy, implementation involves the 
design, construction, and execution of institutions, rules, and pro-
cesses related to that policy. Success occurs when those institutions, 
rules, and processes produce a system consistent with the goals of the 
policy. Some elements of the system are formal legal and regulatory 
actions; others may be informal efforts, such as outreach and coordi-
nation. In the case of marijuana, Amendment Sixty-Four sets the par-
ameters of the policy: a legalized, regulated system for the cultivation 
and purchase of marijuana products, in controlled quantities, for 
individuals twenty-one and older.9 It also provides guidance on taxa-
tion, revenue allocation, and local control.10 Implementation, then, can 
be said to be successful if the state can construct a system that effect-
ively meets the law’s requirements.  
It is important to note that implementation is based on govern-
ment action and behavior and that implementation success and policy 
success can be two very different concepts that should not be con-
flated. By analogy, imagine Congress passes a law that frees every 
federal prisoner in the United States. The Bureau of Prisons then 
draws up plans to time and process prisoners’ release, return personal 
items to inmates, transport inmates to drop-off points in towns and 
cities near federal detention facilities, and so on. The agency could 
empty the nation’s federal penitentiaries flawlessly, without bureau-
cratic delays or mix-ups. Implementation, then, could be a rousing 
 
05/29-politics-marijuana-legalization-galston-dionne (noting greater sup-
port for legal marijuana). 
8. See John Hudak, Opinion, 2014, A Make-or-Break Year for Legal Pot, 
CNN (Dec. 30, 2013, 1:59 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/30/opini
on/hudak-marijuana-2014/?c=&page=1 (arguing that states may “take 
a wait-and-see approach” to marijuana legalization).  
9. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16. 
10. Id. 
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success. Nonetheless, the policy would most likely be an utter failure, 
releasing thousands of dangerous criminals onto the streets. 
This is not to say marijuana legalization is the equivalent of a 
nationwide prisoner amnesty law. Instead, this emphasizes that criti-
cisms of Colorado’s marijuana policy may be on point, even in the 
face of very effective implementation. The reverse can be true as well. 
Supporters of the Affordable Care Act deeply believe that the policy 
is a good one and will be successful, even though the October 2013 
rollout of the federal exchange website was an unmitigated imple-
mentation failure.11 
III. Key Elements of the Colorado Model 
A. Rapid Response: The Implementation Task Force 
Policymakers, politicians, regulators, and bureaucrats are notori-
ous for foot-dragging. As policies are implemented, delays are com-
mon, and missed deadlines are expected. The architects of Amend-
ment Sixty-Four worried that sluggishness could set in and undermine 
legalization efforts after its passage—a concern that did not seem un-
founded. In a September 2012 statement, Colorado Governor John 
Hickenlooper formally opposed the amendment, saying, “Colorado is 
known for many great things—marijuana should not be one of 
them.”12 
As a result, legalization proponents built very strict deadlines into 
the amendment to force the state government’s hand. For example, 
the amendment—passed on November 6, 2012—required the Colorado 
Department of Revenue to “adopt regulations necessary for imple-
mentation” by July 1, 2013.13 State and local licensing procedures had 
to be established by October 1, 2013.14 Essentially, the amendment 
required dramatic changes to state and local administrative proce-
dures in less than a year—a tremendous task for any organization, 
public or private. 
In what was a relief to Amendment Sixty-Four’s backers, Gov-
ernor Hickenlooper announced after the amendment’s passage that his 
personal opposition would not stand in the way of the implementation 
of the public’s mandate. In a November 2012 statement, he noted 
 
11.  See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Rough Obamacare Rollout: 4 Reasons Why, CNN 
(Oct. 23, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/22/politics/oba
macare-website-four-reasons/index.html (discussing the “problems” with 
the Healthcare.gov website). 
12. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Colorado, Gov. Hickenlooper 
Opposes Amendment 64 (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.colorado.gov/cs/S
atellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251630730489. 
13.  Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16. 
14. Id.  
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that “[t]he voters have spoken and we have to respect their will. This 
will be a complicated process, but we intend to follow through.”15 A 
month later, Hickenlooper issued Executive Order B 2012-004, estab-
lishing the Task Force on the Implementation of Amendment Sixty-
Four.16 
The creation of the task force was among the most important 
administrative actions in the implementation of legalized marijuana in 
Colorado. It was also among the most successful. The task force was 
composed of twenty-four standing members and dozens of additional 
members assigned to working groups that engaged specific, relevant 
topics.17 It was chaired by Hickenlooper’s chief legal counsel, Jack 
Finlaw, and the executive director of the Department of Revenue, 
Barbara Brohl, whose agency would be broadly responsible for imple-
mentation, regulation, and enforcement.18 
Membership on the Implementation Task Force was diverse and 
broad-based. It included some passionate legalization supporters, in-
cluding those active in the Amendment Sixty-Four campaign, as well 
as staunch opponents of the measure from the medical and law en-
forcement communities and citizen groups. Stakeholder groups from 
government, business, health care, law enforcement, labor, and other 
areas designed a set of recommendations for the state legislature to 
consider and the Department of Revenue to review.19 
Although task forces can be prone to delays, this one seemed 
motivated by the importance and scope of its mission and by its 
ambitious deadline: the governor gave the task force less than three 
months to complete its job,20 and Amendment Sixty-Four mandated a 
strict constitutional timeline.21  
15. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Colorado, Gov. Hickenlooper 
Statement About Amendment 64 (Nov. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Statement 
About Amendment 64], http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?c=Page&
childpagename=GovHickenlooper%2FCBONLayout&cid=125163368622
8&pagename=CBONWrapper.  
16. Colo. Exec. Order No. B 2012-004 (Dec. 10, 2012).  
17. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue: Enforcement Division–Marijuana, 
Task Force Report on the Implementation of Amendment 64: 
Regulation of Marijuana in Colorado, 11–13, 124–28 (2013) 
[hereinafter Task Force Report]. There were five working groups 
under the task force. They were the Regulatory Framework Working 
Group; the Local Authority and Control Working Group; the Tax, 
Funding, and Civil Law Working Group; the Consumer Safety and 
Social Issues Working Group; and the Criminal Law Working Group. Id. 
at 12.  
18. Id. at 11.  
19. Id. at 15. 
20. Id. at 4.  
21.  Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16. 
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In March 2013, the task force completed its work and issued a 
nearly 170-page report on how the state of Colorado should imple-
ment Amendment Sixty-Four.22 The state legislature and governor 
approved many of the recommendations that spring. Implementation 
thereupon began in earnest, and a series of drastic changes and 
transformations ensued. 
B. Signals from the Top: Gubernatorial Leadership 
Drastic administrative change cannot be successful without lead-
ership committed to making it work. In Colorado, strong leadership at 
the top was absolutely critical. Governor Hickenlooper set the tone 
from which many state officials took cues. He essentially told state 
workers, appointees and career staff alike, that whatever their 
personal opinions were, they had a job to do.23 The governor’s con-
spicuous commitment ensured that the Department of Revenue and 
other state agencies would have backing from leadership to carry out 
the constitutionally required mission. 
In interviews, state employees, including Barbara Brohl, the exec-
utive director of the Department of Revenue, noted that the 
governor’s tone, approach, and support had an impact on the business 
of government.24 People inside and outside the government praised his 
willingness to accept the public will, uphold the constitution, and be 
supportive of the process. Christian Sederberg, a Denver attorney who 
helped lead the Amendment Sixty-Four effort (later serving on the 
Implementation Task Force), explicitly noted Hickenlooper’s office 
“has handled [marijuana legalization] well.”25 
Leadership is contagious within government. Weak leadership, 
corner-cutting, bureaucratic resistance, and organizational strife can 
compound each other’s ill effects. Alternatively, good leadership can 
breed good decision making and effective governance. Hickenlooper’s 
 
22. Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 4.  
23. See Statement About Amendment 64, supra note 15 (“The voters have 
spoken and we have to respect their will.”). Colorado Attorney General 
John Suthers has a similar disposition toward the issue. Press Release, 
Colo. Dept. of Law, Attorney General Releases Statement on Recrea-
tional Use of Marijuana Legislation (May 8, 2013), http://www.colorado 
attorneygeneral.gov/press/news/2013/05/08/attorney_general_releases
_statement_recreational_use_marijuana_legislation (noting that in 
spite of his personal belief that the law is “bad public policy,” his office 
would “continue to . . . implement regulations”). 
24.  See, e.g., Interview with Barbara Brohl, Executive Director of the De-
partment of Revenue (Apr. 30, 2014). 
25. Michael Roberts, Amendment 64’s Christian Sederberg Upbeat About 
Being Named to Marijuana Act’s Task Force, Den. Westword Blogs 
(Dec. 11, 2012, 1:14 PM), http://blogs.westword.com/latestword/2012/12/
amendment_64_task_force_marijuana_christian_sederberg.php?page=2. 
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style is no magic elixir that guarantees success. However, if the 
governor had taken a more polarizing approach or one that reflected 
his personal opinion, the results would have been quite different. 
C. Preventing Crossed Wires: Internal Coordination 
Hickenlooper’s leadership went beyond setting a constructive tone 
and organizing a task force. Within his own office, he saw a need for 
better coordination and leadership on the marijuana issue. In res-
ponse, in February 2014, he hired Andrew Freedman to be the state’s 
first Director of Marijuana Coordination. Freedman works closely 
with state government and private stakeholders, organizing twice-
monthly policy meetings with the governor’s staff to help coordinate 
policy, identify problems that exist or may arise, and improve 
communication among policy staff.26 Hickenlooper also organized col-
laborative monthly cabinet meetings. 
Although routine in the private sector (the background from 
which the governor hails), these kinds of measures to foster internal 
coordination in state government are not necessarily common. They 
should be, however, because they offer important advantages. Regular 
face-to-face coordination encourages stakeholders with diverse view-
points and interests to communicate and collaborate. Director Brohl 
noted that “[t]he task-force model has been used throughout the 
process . . . and keeps everyone at the table.”27 Also, regular meetings 
can increase morale, accountability, and rapport.  
In Colorado, the emphasis on coordination reflects a reality: 
marijuana legalization affects more than just the Department of Reve-
nue (the agency charged with regulating marijuana). The reform 
affects agriculture, transportation, public health, law enforcement, 
and more. Bringing leaders together regularly can help decrease the 
likelihood that communication and policy breakdowns will occur.  
D. Administrative Reboot: Agency Reorganization and Staffing  
Changes within government occurred beyond the office of the 
governor. Initially, enforcement of legalized medicinal marijuana fell 
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Revenue’s Medical Mari-
juana Enforcement Division (“MMED”).28 MMED was established in 
July 2010 to bring regulatory order to what was widely seen as a  
26. This kind of internal coordination is essential for good administration 
but is often underutilized in government. Some of the most notorious re-
cent scandals in federal and state governments involve failures of com-
munication and coordination within government. 
27. Interview with Barbara Brohl, Executive Director of the Department of 
Revenue, State of Colorado (Apr. 30, 2014). 
28. See Office of the State Auditor, Medical Marijuana Regula-
tory System, Part I, at 16 (2013) [hereinafter Medical Marijuana 
Regulatory System]. 
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chaotic and out-of-control medical marijuana system.29 The division 
was fraught with problems, from leadership to administrative ineffic-
iency to funding, and a 2013 audit shed a very public light on the 
problems at MMED.30  
In response to the audit and the passage of Amendment Sixty-
Four, the Implementation Task Force recommended that the Depart-
ment of Revenue dramatically redesign the enforcement division, both 
to overcome the problems at MMED and to prepare for retail mari-
juana.31 Ultimately, in May 2013, the legislature passed and the 
governor signed H.B. 13-1317, which implemented many of the task 
force’s recommendations; created the new Marijuana Enforcement 
Division (“MED”), which oversaw the implementation and regulation 
of both types of legalized marijuana in the state32; and changed the 
manner in which the regulatory body was funded (more on this 
later).33 
The reforms at MED and the Department of Revenue came with 
some dramatic personnel changes. Two individuals were promoted 
from within to introduce new leadership. Ron Kammerzell was named 
Senior Director of Enforcement for the Department of Revenue, and 
Lewis Koski was named Director of Marijuana Enforcement. The divi-
sion is also staffing below leadership positions in an effort to enhance 
its enforcement capacity.  
Kammerzell and Koski have internalized the task force and work-
ing group, taking care to include a diverse set of opponents and pro-
ponents. This approach is used to promulgate rules, to engage in 
regulatory lookback, and to improve marijuana policy into the future. 
In a very real sense, they have sought to transform the manner in 
which the Department of Revenue works with and serves the public. 
They rely on what they called “a contemporary approach to 
 
29.  See generally Marijuana Enforcement, Colo. Dep’t Revenue En-
forcement Division (last visited Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.colo 
rado.gov/pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement (describing the 
general purpose of the department and its now dual task of regulating 
the retail and medical marijuana regimes in Colorado).  
30.  Medical Marijuana Regulatory System, supra note 28, at 1 
(making recommendations for correcting the issues faced by the 
MMED).  
31. For clarity, “retail marijuana” serves as a shorthand—in regulatory 
language and for the remainder of this Article—for marijuana that is 
regulated, commercial, and recreational.  
32. Some of the administrative authority over the medical program also 
rests with the Department of Public Health and Environment. See 
Medical Marijuana, Colo. Dep’t Pub. Health & Env’t (2013), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/medicalmarijuana (describing 
the medical marijuana application process).  
33. H.B. 13-1317 (Colo. 2013). 
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regulation” and insisted that even though relying on working groups 
took more time, it produced better outcomes. 
Kammerzell explained that “a new area [of regulation] without 
much information lends itself to diversity.”34 Koski noted that divers-
ity allows people to “feel they’ve been heard” and “get to understand 
the opposition.”35 Inclusiveness is especially important in marijuana 
policy, where information asymmetry is a pressing concern: the gov-
ernment must rely on nongovernmental stakeholder groups for much 
information about a product that, until recently, was illegal in Colo-
rado for nearly a century. 
The inclusive, consultative approach seems to be paying off. In 
my conversations, people on both sides of the debate offered very few 
positive reviews about the predecessor division—the MMED. By 
contrast, the new division—the MED—was broadly praised. Marco 
Vasquez of the Colorado Association of Chiefs of Police noted that 
“MED is light years ahead” of the previous division.36 Meg Collins, 
executive director of the Cannabis Business Alliance, said that “MED 
has facilitated a real partnership with industry, which is necessary 
because their success is intertwined.”37 
All told, what happened at the Department of Revenue and the 
new Marijuana Enforcement Division was a wholesale administrative 
reorganization—never an easy thing to achieve, especially in a 
political environment. The design of new administrative institutions 
and the overhaul of existing ones (both of which happened as part of 
the implementation of Amendment Sixty-Four) are often driven by 
political compromise, not bureaucratic efficiency. In Colorado, fortun-
ately, both the Department of Revenue and MED had a constitu-
tional mandate, public and legislative support, industry cooperation, 
and the political space to reform a troubled institution in ways that 
improved governance, rather than simply satisfied politics. 
E. Nuts and Bolts of Policy Change: The Regulatory System 
A long treatise could be written detailing all of the regulatory 
changes that have gone into effect statewide in response to Amend-
ment Sixty-Four and the associated legislative action. Below I high-
 
34. Interview with Ron Kammerzell, Senior Dir. of Enforcement for the 
Dep’t of Revenue, State of Colo. (May 13, 2014).  
35. Interview with Lewis Koski, Dir. of Marijuana Enforcement, State of 
Colo. (May 13, 2014). 
36.  Brandon Evans, Colorado’s Retail Marijuana Rollout Ruled “Success” 
According to Report, Summit Daily (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www. 
summitdaily.com/news/12516103-113/marijuana-medical-retail-rollout. 
37.  Id.  
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light six regulatory actions38 that are particularly significant. A more 
detailed discussion of each is available in the Appendix. 
 
1.  Seed-to-Sale Tracking System 
In an effort to track and monitor supply and prevent diversion, 
the state requires a Marijuana Inventory Tracking Solution 
(MITS).39 The system tracks every plant in every cultivation 
facility with a barcode tagging system that is computerized and 
accessible to MED regulators. These RFID Barcodes can remain 
separate or can be batched as plant product is combined, so 
that product can be tracked from planting to purchase (seed to 
sale). The tracking system is technologically advanced, compre-
hensive, and serves as the backbone for the regulatory regime’s 
enforcement activities.40  
2.  Vertical Integration 
The Implementation Task Force recommended, and the legisla-
ture approved, a vertically integrated structure for the mari-
juana market (at least in its initial rollout). With vertical integ-
ration, “cultivation, processing and manufacturing, and retail 
sales must be a common enterprise.”41 This system initially lim-
its the complexity of the market—in size, scope, and activities 
of participants—in ways that reduce the early regulatory chal-
lenges for MED. Vertical integration and inventory tracking 
work in concert to limit diversion and to increase the enforce-
ment capacity of regulators during the critical incubation period 
of implementation.  
3.  Temporary Barriers to New Entry and 
Preferences for Existing Producers 
Colorado further reduced the complexity of the market by 
constructing initial barriers to entry for new marijuana firms. 
The legislature required that, for a period of time, all retail 
marijuana enterprises must come from or be part of existing 
 
38. Note that “regulatory activities” are meant to include government 
actions that became part of the regulatory apparatus. That means not 
simply agency rulemaking. 
39. Colo. Code. Regs. § 212-2.309.  
40. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Permanent Rules Related to the 
Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, R 309 Retail Marijuana  
Establishments: Marijuana Inventory Tracking Solution 
(MITS) 43–44 (2013).  
41. Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 16.  
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medical marijuana enterprises.42 This move increased enforce-
ment capacity, ensured higher levels of entrepreneurial experi-
ence at the start, and limited the size of the industry. It also 
ensured that as implementation began, state regulators would 
be dealing only with enterprises and owners with whom they 
were already familiar, creating a key advantage for regulators 
adjusting to a new policy environment and learning along the 
way. 
4. Limits on Quantities Purchased 
Amendment Sixty-Four and subsequent state regulations put 
limits on the quantity of marijuana that could be sold to indiv-
iduals: one ounce for Coloradans and a quarter ounce for visit-
ors.43 The goal was to limit diversion after purchase. While 
other regulations like vertical integration and inventory tracking 
seek to deal with diversion risks during production, quantity 
limits are a means of preventing consumer- rather than 
producer-based diversion. Purchase limits make hoarding more 
difficult and time intensive. They are complemented by possess-
ion limits to discourage marijuana’s resale on the Colorado 
black market or its transfer to other states. 
5.  Video Surveillance Requirements 
MED regulators required that cultivation, processing, and retail 
facilities be extensively monitored with video surveillance.44 The 
benefits of this regulation are twofold. First, video surveillance 
aims to prevent diversion and, in case of theft, help police 
investigate. Second, MED regulators expect the system to be 
cash-only for some time, and surveillance may reduce the risks 
that cash-dependent enterprises face. The surveillance require-
ments will not stop all crime or limit every risk, but they will 
reduce the incentives for illegal activity by increasing the odds 
of detection. 
6. Marijuana Revenue and Funding Distribution 
The state enacted dramatic changes to the tax revenue system 
surrounding marijuana. Under the old system, the former Med-
ical Marijuana Enforcement Division endured nearly constant 
budget deficits and managerial challenges. The new system pro-
vides marijuana tax revenue to fund MED, as well as funding 
related policy areas like education, prevention, and public  
42. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-43.4-104(1)(a)(I) (2014).  
43.  E.g., Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16; Colo. Code. Regs. § 212-2.402. 
44. Colo. Code. Regs. § 212-2.306 (2013) (detailing the video surveillance 
requirements for marijuana retailers). 
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safety. It also diverts a portion of funds to unrelated policy 
areas like school construction. The new system allows for more 
regulatory stability, creating an agency that is self-funded, while 
using the excess to ensure that other policy groups have a stake 
of the success of the new marijuana industry.45 The latter move 
is an effective means of building and maintaining public support 
for the new policy. 
These and other formal rules promulgated by the MED have 
emerged from a cooperative process that involved government, indus-
try, and other stakeholder groups—including proponents, opponents, 
and those offering no position on the policy. 
Here again, inclusivity is a distinctive and important feature of 
Colorado’s approach. Industry, for example, plays a central role in the 
regulatory process, because it has a wealth of policy-specific informa-
tion. As Todd Mitchem, the chief revenue officer of O.penVAPE, a 
company that makes a marijuana vaporizer pen, noted, “The state 
needs help from industry.”46 The state’s experience with legal mari-
juana sales—via the medical market—was limited; private industry is 
able to fill in information gaps. Christian Sederberg, the Amendment 
Sixty-Four advocate, echoed several others in explaining what is nec-
essary for regulatory success: “Especially in an area where it’s all new 
[policy], there’s a need for there to be a link between the regulator 
and the regulated.”47 
Although some regulators at both state and federal levels are 
accused of being too cozy with industry, the diversity of marijuana 
supporters, opponents, and other experts consulted by regulators 
seems to allow an opportunity for all sides to be heard. Various 
stakeholders, including law enforcement, told me they enjoy a good 
working relationship with both the governor’s office and the Mari-
juana Enforcement Division.  
F. Colorado’s Change in Culture and Perspective 
Changes in Colorado have gone far beyond administrative 
reorganization, the creation of new regulations, and a new tone from 
state leaders. In many ways, legalization in Colorado has led to dra-
matic cultural changes among key groups in the state. 
Overall, the perspective on legalization has remained quite stable 
among Coloradans. Amendment Sixty-Four was approved by 
 
45. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-28.8-203 (2014) (designating that proceeds from 
the retail marijuana sales tax shall go to the state’s old age pension 
fund). 
46. Interview with Todd Mitchem, Chief Revenue Officer, O.penVAPE 
(May 16, 2014).  
47. Interview with Christian Sederberg, Partner, Vicente Sederberg, LLC 
(May 12, 2014).  
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approximately 55 percent of state voters in 2012, and a 2014 public 
opinion survey suggests that 57 percent of Colorado residents con-
tinue to support legalization; the results also show that 61 percent of 
voters believe legalization has made the state better or not made 
much of a difference.48  
However, other groups in the state are undergoing significant 
cultural and attitudinal changes. In particular, the law enforcement 
community—a group that was largely opposed to Amendment Sixty-
Four—is adjusting to the new law. Taking a cue from Hickenlooper, 
many law enforcement officials are seeking ways to acculturate officers 
to legal marijuana while simultaneously ensuring that other, related 
laws are enforced effectively.  
Training is a central component of this task. Glenn Davis, the 
highway safety manager for the Colorado Department of Transporta-
tion and a member of the Interagency Task Force on Drunk Driving, 
explained that better training among police is important not just for 
officers but for the public with whom they interact. Driving impaired, 
he pointed out, has always been against the law, but reliably detect-
ing impairment may be more of a challenge if easier access to mari-
juana increases the incidence of driving under the influence. Davis 
said, “The best defense is well-trained officers.”49 
Changes in law enforcement, he said, have been coordinated at 
the state level, and state officials have worked with local law 
enforcement to help them better understand what changes mean for 
communities. Chief Marco Vasquez of the Colorado Association of 
Chiefs of Police explained that his group is trying to “develop a 
program that identifies best practices for law enforcement” regarding 
marijuana policy that could be used within Colorado and be “trans-
mitted to other states as they legalize.”50 In this way, law enforcement 
leaders see the state’s vanguard status as an opportunity to get 
enforcement right and help their brothers in blue elsewhere deal with 
policy changes in the future. 
Chief Vasquez cited a broader cultural change: the introduction of 
retail sales, he said, “was at least a more honest conversation than 
medical.”51 Even though the number of medical users has increased 
 
48. Tom Jensen, Colorado Happy with Marijuana Legalization, Supports 
Gay Marriage, Pub. Policy Polling (Mar. 19, 2014, 1:56 PM), 
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2014/03/colorado-happy-
with-marijuana-legalization-supports-gay-marriage.html.  
49. Anna Hanel, Colorado to Start New Campaign Against Driving While 
High, Colo. Pub. Radio (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.cpr.org/news/sto
ry/colorado-start-new-campaign-against-driving-while-high.  
50. Interview with Marco Vasquez, Member of the Colo. Assoc. of Chiefs of 
Police (May 14, 2014).  
51. Id.  
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since legalization (more on this below), the introduction of legal retail 
sales has improved insight for those who felt the old system was a 
sham. By reducing the recourse to wink-and-nod circumventions of 
medical marijuana rules, such “policy honesty” may temper resent-
ment, improve the new policy’s perceived legitimacy, and encourage 
compliance. 
Finally, changes have coursed their way through advocacy 
communities and the industry itself. Several respondents noted that 
the industry wants effective regulation and enforcement. Members of 
the industry realize that if inadequate regulation leads to serious pub-
lic policy problems, public support may plummet. Moreover, the 
threat of federal intervention, however defined, looms large over the 
legal marijuana market in Colorado, and that threat induces members 
of the industry to push for and comply with regulations. “Industry 
has incentives to abide by the rules,” Michael Elliott of the Marijuana 
Industry Group explains.52  
A common observation in my interviews was that the federal 
threat improved compliance, brought industry to the table, motivated 
firms to play by the rules, induced the industry to see the need for 
regulation, and facilitated communication between industry and regu-
lators. The Colorado’s largely smooth and cooperative rollout of legal-
ization has had an assist from the unlikeliest of places: the federal 
government’s war on drugs. 
IV. The Challenges of Implementation: 
Present and Future 
Although much has gone well in Colorado, implementation has 
not come without difficulties. The challenges facing Colorado are di-
verse, but a few stand out. This Part will assess them.  
One topic this Article does not address is banking.53 Marijuana 
enterprises lack access to financial services—a severe problem both for 
marijuana businesses and for law enforcement.54 While Colorado has 
sought state-level remedies,55 the problem is not one of implement-
 
52. Interview with Michael Elliott, Member of the Marijuana Indus. Grp. 
(May 15, 2014). 
53. For perspectives on legal marijuana banking issues, see generally Julie 
Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 597 (2015). 
54. Id. at 601.  
55. Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 11-33-101 to -128 (2014). The legislation sought to establish mari-
juana financial cooperatives. However, most people are skeptical that 
the Federal Reserve will approve those entities, as is required by the leg-
islation itself.  
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ation at the state level. A solution is federal in scope,56 lying outside 
the compass of this Article.  
Before jumping into an analysis of other challenges, I offer one 
caveat. Implementation problems do not necessarily equal failure. 
Such problems can lead to failure, of course. But they no more doom 
Colorado’s legalization policy than sound implementation ensures the 
policy’s success. 
A. Edibles and the Path to Overindulgence  
During interviews for this Article, observers repeatedly raised the 
problem of edibles. This issue worries supporters and opponents of le-
galization alike. 
Why are edibles such a big concern? The reasons are multiple. 
The title of the new Product Potency and Serving Size Working 
Group points to significant issues the state faces. In many cases, serv-
ing sizes can lead to overconsumption of THC, because naive users do 
not have a complete grasp of product dosing and because self-
regulation in the consumption of standard food is so different than 
what is required with marijuana edibles. In some cases, serving sizes 
are clear and intuitive; in others they are not. 
In my own trip to a retail marijuana dispensary, I observed a 
couple interested in purchasing a marijuana brownie. The “bud-
tender” explained in detail to the buyer that the brownie contained 
six servings and that proper consumption involved dividing the 
brownie or biting off a small chunk. The information was correct and 
clear, but who eats a sixth of a brownie or a quarter of a candy bar? 
Moreover, people who smoke, dab, or vape marijuana experience the 
effects quickly. However, edibles can take thirty to sixty minutes be-
fore the consumer feels a “high.” As a result, an individual—particu-
larly one unfamiliar with marijuana edibles—may overconsume, be-
lieving the product is ineffective. Overconsumption can have negative 
consequences.57  
 
56. Proposals such as this exist. See Marijuana Businesses Access to Bank-
ing Act of 2013, H.R. 2652, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill had thirty-two 
cosponsors and effectively died in committee. H.R. 2652 (113th): Mari-
juana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013, Govtrack.us,  
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2652 (last visited Jan. 
16, 2015).  
57. Overconsumption is associated with tremendous fatigue and an upset 
stomach. Fears in the medical community also exist that such consump-
tion can lead to serious psychoactive effects. Maureen Dowd, Don’t 
Harsh Our Mellow, Dude, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2014, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/opinion/dowd-dont-harsh-our-mellow-
dude.html?_r=0. The challenge, of course, is that research on the effects 
of overconsumption of THC is quite limited, often stymied by federal 
marijuana prohibitions. 
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Inconsistent potency is also a serious problem. Recent reporting 
from the Denver Post examined THC levels in a series of marijuana 
edibles, testing samples labeled 100mg per edible package.58 The 
results were alarming. In some cases, 100mg edible packages contained 
less than half of one milligram of THC. In others, 100mg packages 
had nearly 1.5 times the stated amount of THC.59 Potency errors 
make even responsible consumption a challenge. When there is sub-
stantially more THC in an edible than is labeled, overconsumption 
can occur even when the consumer follows directions carefully. When 
THC content is lower than labeled, the user may be lulled into over-
consuming a subsequent edible. Either way, the result is a dangerous 
miscalculation.  
Edibles come in forms—including candies, chocolates, brownies, 
cereals, and the like—that pose serious risks of accidental consump-
tion by children and others. The look of some edibles, reminiscent of 
candy cigarettes, also appeals to children. The difference, of course, is 
that candy cigarettes have no tobacco; edibles contain cannabis 
extracts. Labeling, packaging, and products themselves present serious 
concerns, and ones which, to date, the state has failed to deal with in 
a comprehensive and effective way. 
A final concern about edibles, often under-discussed, emerged in 
my discussions with Dr. Larry Wolk, the executive director of the 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment. He noted 
that edibles pose food safety concerns. In Colorado, the state has 
regulatory authority over edibles60; yet food safety is often regulated 
at local levels. Trying to systematize food safety rules thus is difficult 
in this area. With limited federal guidance,61 scant research and 
testing, and a regulatory environment complicated by dual state and 
local jurisdiction, the issue of marijuana-edible food safety is a com-
plex one that state and local governments have only begun to address 
comprehensively.62  
 
58. Ricardo Baca, Labels Fudge THC Levels, The Denver Post, Mar. 9, 
2014, at A17.  
59. Id. (“Incredibles’ Mile High Mint chocolate bar advertises 100 milli-
grams of THC but instead included 146.”).  
60. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-43.4-202 (2014).  
61. The US Food and Drug Administration considers any food with 
cannabis concentrate to be “adulterated.” Interview with Dr. Larry 
Wolk, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t (May 15, 2014). 
62. See generally Brandon Rittiman, Colorado to Revisit Rules on Edible  
Marijuana Products, KUSA-TV (Apr. 28, 2014, 7:16 PM), http://www. 
9news.com/story/news/politics/2014/04/28/colorado-to-revisit-rules-on-
edible-marijuana-products/8425137/ (discussing recent cases of edibles 
overconsumption and possible state regulation).  
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The state’s initial implementation efforts in the context of edibles 
have been lacking. Issues with serving sizes, potency, and the nature 
and look of edibles continue. MED has had the regulatory authority 
to address such problems, but emergency and subsequent regulations 
have led to a system in which industry insiders as well as legalization 
opponents have frequently echoed each other in arguing that more 
should and must be done. 
How is the state responding? Because of the obvious weaknesses 
in the state’s initial rules surrounding edibles, the state organized an 
Edible Product Production Safety Working Group, seeking better 
health and safety regulations surrounding the production of edibles. 
But those efforts, likewise, were not comprehensive enough to solve 
the problems.63 Subsequently, the state took legislative and regulatory 
actions to deal with edibles in a more direct and comprehensive way.64 
First, the Department of Revenue organized the Retail Marijuana 
Product Potency and Serving Size Working Group, chaired by Ron 
Kammerzell and Lewis Koski. Like other, similar groups, this working 
group is composed of a variety of members from different stakeholder 
communities. It began meeting in April 2014.65  
Second, MED organized a Mandatory Testing and Random 
Sampling Working Group, which put in place a more comprehensive 
product testing program. The goal is not just to check product  
63. This working group eventually recommended Rule 604, which was 
adopted by the state in 2013. Retail Marijuana Products Manufacturing 
Facility: Health and Safety Regulations, Colo. Code. Regs. 
§ 212-2.604 (2014). This regulation was targeted to work-site health 
requirements surrounding sanitary environments and production  
processes. 
64. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-43.4-202 (2014), as amended by H.B. 14-1361, 
69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014), and as amended by HB 
14-1366, 69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014). These bills 
require MED to promulgate rules that will address concerns about 
edibles—establishing equivalency standards between marijuana flower 
and edibles and to expand potency testing—by January 2016. 
65. Colo. Dep’t Revenue Press Release, Colo. Dept. of Revenue, Colorado 
Department of Revenue Announces Retail Marijuana Product Potency 







570162&ssbinary=true. As this Article was being written, the working 
group had not yet produced draft or proposed rules on the topics that 
fall under its jurisdiction. The decision to begin the process with an 
open discussion that will search for common ground, rather than with a 
draft rule that would serve as a starting point, was heralded as an 
effective approach by Kammerzell and Koski in interviews with them. 
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potency but also to set up laboratory certification processes and stan-
dards for testing facilities. Those rules took effect in the spring  
of 2014. 
Those efforts are unlikely to be final. Industry insiders as well as 
legalization opponents have frequently echoed each other in arguing 
that more should and must be done. And good regulation often 
requires a trial-and-error approach until the institutions and rules 
surrounding a policy are effective. Colorado has already shown a 
willingness to adapt as it learns, a flexibility it should strive to  
maintain. 
Some interpret the need to revise earlier regulatory efforts as a 
problem, a sign that implementation has failed. In reality, regulatory 
lookback is a sign of agency accountability. Lookback is a common, 
effective, and necessary part of the administrative process, and it 
strengthens the ability of the state to deal with public policy prob-
lems. Lookback, and particularly an agency’s awareness of the need to 
do it, is a sign of a regulatory system that is working, not one that is 
broken.  
B. Homegrows and the Limits of the Regulatory State 
Amendment Sixty-Four gives individuals the constitutional right 
to grow marijuana plants at home.66 The practice, commonly referred 
to as “homegrows,” was, in part, an effort by advocates to shore up 
political support among legalization advocates who wanted to begin 
(or continue) the home cultivation of marijuana.67  
At the same time, homegrows provided additional benefits for 
advocates by widening the scope of marijuana cultivation in the state, 
in a way that allowed residents living in jurisdictions that opted out 
of commercial production to have access to marijuana. In this way, 
homegrows allow Coloradans a legal (constitutional) basis for growing 
marijuana in communities in which it cannot be purchased or for 
individuals who prefer home cultivation to commercial marijuana. 
 
66. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16 (3)(b) (affirming the right of “possess-
ing, growing, processing, or transporting no more than six marijuana 
plants, with three or fewer being mature, flowering plants, and possess-
ion of the marijuana produced by the plants on the premises where the 
plants were grown, provided that the growing takes place in an 
enclosed, locked space, is not conducted openly or publicly, and is not 
made available for sale”). 
67. Interview with Christian Sederberg, Partner, Vicente Sederberg, LLC, 
(May 12, 2014). Advocates, such as Christian Sederberg, also asserted 
that the inclusion of homegrows into the language of Amendment 
Sixty-Four could further buffer the state from federal intervention. 
Their argument was that the federal government would be less inter-
ested in enjoining or otherwise stopping the regulated system, while 
being ill-equipped to stop homegrows across a state without state-level 
marijuana prohibitions. Id. 
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Some restrictions concerning homegrows were written into Am-
endment Sixty-Four.68 Yet, beyond those provisions, the state has 
done little to regulate homegrows, in large part because the amend-
ment’s language is clear.69 However, the clarity of the constitutional 
provisions does not mute some serious problems associated with 
homegrows.70  
The law enforcement community and the marijuana industry both 
worry about homegrowers’ potential to skirt the law. Chief Marco 
Vasquez said, “Homegrows are problematic because they are a bit 
outside of MED’s jurisdiction.”71 Michael Elliott of the Marijuana 
Industry Group bluntly assessed the situation: “Homegrows are where 
the black market has gone to.”72 Many worry that homegrowers may 
grow more marijuana than they are allowed and present an oppor-
tunity to divert product to illegal markets in Colorado or markets 
across state lines. Such activities remove customers and revenue from 
the legal retail market and risk federal intervention. 
Because homegrows rest outside the jurisdiction of the MED, the 
division is unable to prevent other types of risky problems that it 
seeks to regulate. Those include product safety, production quality, 
and environmental issues like black mold that can invade production 
spaces. Law enforcement also echoed concerns that crimes like bur-
glary and larceny may affect homegrow operations and could create 
additional, localized crime problems.73 
A final concern that several respondents echoed with regard to 
homegrows involves hash oil extraction, which can produce THC and 
CBD—rich oils from marijuana used for dabbing, vaping, edibles, and 
 
68. E.g., Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16 (3)(c) (limiting how much personal 
harvest can be transferred and to whom—one ounce to an individual 
twenty-one or older).  
69. In order to deal with homegrow operations and the issues surrounding 
them, local governments have used zoning authority to create additional 
regulations. 
70. It does, however, highlight the possible challenges posed when using the 
constitutional route to legalize marijuana. The stability that constitu-
tional changes offer can also lead to unintended inflexibility when prob-
lems arise. Colorado’s legalization experiment demonstrates both. 
71. Interview with Marco Vasquez, Member of the Colo. Assoc. of Chiefs of 
Police (May 14, 2014).  
72. Interview with Michael Elliott, Member of the Marijuana Indus. Grp. 
(May 15, 2014). 
73. It is still early to judge crime statistics, and time will tell whether there 
are systematic relationships between homegrows and crime rates in the 
longer term. In fact, proponents of Amendment Sixty-Four argued that 
the inclusion of homegrows in the language of the amendment would 
hedge against federal intervention into the regulated market in ways 
that would leave only home operations in existence. 
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other uses. Extraction relies on the use of a solvent, one of which (the 
highly flammable gas butane) has led to widely publicized explosions 
causing property damage and bodily harm. Some states, including 
Washington and California, have banned or substantially restricted 
hash-oil extraction. Colorado has not yet caught up in an effective 
way. 
How has the government responded to homegrow concerns? For 
first responders, state and local governments have been expanding 
training and information about homegrow hazards and hash-oil ex-
traction incidents. Second, state and especially local government 
efforts have tried to address problems surrounding homegrows, partic-
ularly in the context of hash-oil extraction.74 For example, local 
zoning and environmental regulatory authorities have been used by 
jurisdictions to place restrictions on homegrows. 
Such efforts should be expanded and refined. A coordinated effort 
to rein in homegrow operations and make them safer is critical. 
Efforts like the oft-used working-group model, bringing together state 
and local officials with experience dealing with homegrows, would 
foster a discussion of best practices. 
Because homegrows are protected under the state constitution, 
the Colorado Supreme Court may ultimately need to step in and 
define regulatory boundaries.75 If those boundaries are inconsistent 
with sensible, effective homegrow regulation, a last resort may be to 
propose and pass a second constitutional amendment. That may be 
quite feasible, because proponents of a regulated, legal marijuana 
marketplace would likely join opponents of legalization to regulate or 
otherwise deal with homegrows.76 
 
74. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 9-7-113 (2014) (“A local government may ban 
the use of a compressed, flammable gas as a solvent in the extraction of 
THC or other cannabinoids in a residential setting.”). The limited 
statutory language in this context offers local governments the option to 
regulate processes. Id.  
75. The legal test approach to homegrow regulatory expansion is not an 
easy one. There are functional issues that limit the state’s ability to 
regulate homegrows. Primarily, state and local governments do not have 
the funding, personnel, or capacity to regulate homegrows and conduct 
monitoring and enforcement operations. Moreover, regulating home-
grows raises serious constitutional concerns, not just from the provisions 
of Colo. Const. art. XVIII, but also constitutional provisions sur-
rounding search and seizure. 
76. E.g., H.B. 13-1318, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013). 
When Proposition AA passed in November 2013, creating a tax frame-
work for retail marijuana, some of the opponents—aside from anti-tax 
purists—were a group of legalization proponents who found such taxa-
tion unfair. Supporters of regulated, taxed, and legalized marijuana 
joined opponents of legalization who desired to reap the revenues from 
an already-approved marijuana marketplace. It is hard to imagine that a 
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Homegrows pose legal as well as logistical challenges for 
Colorado’s regulators. Coping with them, however, is unavoidable, for 
the sake of public safety, good government, and keeping the federal 
government at bay.  
C. Medical Marijuana and Pot Tourism: 
The Problem of Misaligned Incentives 
Throughout this Article, I discuss some of the ways in which laws, 
regulations, and informal policies create behavioral incentives inside 
and outside the marijuana market—both for consumers and 
producers. Realigning incentives was, indeed, a major rationale for 
legalization in Colorado. By bringing the market under state power, 
the state could reduce the risks and challenges that black markets 
create.  
Under the new regime, however, a few incentives remain problem-
atic. One involves medical marijuana; another, marijuana tourism and 
public use. 
It is no secret in Colorado that some medical marijuana users use 
without a legitimate medical need. The state has an obvious interest 
in moving some “gray market” medical consumers to the new retail 
market. Unfortunately, the tax and fee structures for medical and 
retail marijuana did nothing to limit gray market activity. The med-
ical marijuana tax is quite low—2.9 percent77—and the fee for a red 
card, the document a medical marijuana patient needs in order to 
access the market, was reduced.78 When the retail market came 
online, it featured substantially higher taxes—due to a voter-approved 
ballot initiative setting taxes. Some in the industry also noted that 
medical marijuana pricing, in many cases, is lower than that of retail. 
The result is not surprising: the goal of pushing “gray market 
actors” away from the medical market and toward the retail market 
failed. In fact, Wolk of CDPHE—the agency that maintains the med-
ical marijuana registry—noted that since legalization of retail 
marijuana, the number of registered medical patients has increased. 
Thus, the effort to shrink medical marijuana rolls—and collect the 
retail-market tax revenue that comes with it—has not borne fruit.  
One possible solution is to adjust tax rates by raising medical 
rates, reducing retail rates, or some combination of the two. Such 
 
similar coalition could not be forged with regard to homegrow  
regulation. 
77. Colorado Marijuana Tax Data, Colo. Dep’t Revenue, https://www. 
colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/colorado-marijuana-tax-data (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2015). 
78. Ryan Parker, Med Pot Fee Drops to $15, Denver Post, Dec. 19, 2013, 
at A6.  
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proposals, however, would either be ineffective or would infuriate 
medical marijuana users, who would claim that legitimate medical 
patients are being punished for others’ actions—a cause with poor 
political optics. Wolk suggested tightening access to the medical mar-
ket, for example, by requiring doctors to demonstrate medical neces-
sity rather than merely issue a recommendation.79 A medical necessity 
system would require better-defined rules from CDPHE and the medi-
cal community about which symptoms, conditions, and medical situa-
tions would qualify for medical marijuana.  
One way or another, the issue will need to be addressed. Legalized 
marijuana in Colorado was not supposed to drive retail users toward 
the medical market. A good-government approach should do all it can 
to rectify these misaligned incentives, while remaining sensitive to the 
healthcare needs of legitimate medical patients. 
Another odd incentive structure involves tourists’ access to retail 
marijuana—especially in the form of edibles.80 Perversely, if unintent-
ionally, current policies drive tourists to the edibles market, creating 
risks for public health and safety.  
For a visitor to Colorado—even one who did not purchase mari-
juana—those incentives are clear. Upon arriving in Denver, I checked 
into my hotel, where staff explained I would have to pay a fee of 
several hundred dollars if the scent of smoke was found in my room. 
Moreover, the public use of marijuana remains illegal in the state. 
Denver also bans smoking clubs. Thus, if I went to Denver with the 
hope of smoking marijuana, I would need to use someone’s home. On 
the other hand, I can easily purchase an edible and consume it in my 
hotel room without incurring any penalties. And when it comes to 
edibles, tourists tend to be naive users—the highest-risk group. 
Regulatory implementation could modify these inverted incent-
ives. Notably, it would be helpful for the state (and localities) to 
think through the consequences of defining what it means for a venue 
to be “public,” a murky subject that has been the source of much con-
troversy. In one well-publicized case, the Denver Symphony organized 
a fundraiser to which guests were encouraged to bring their own 
marijuana. The city of Denver attempted (unsuccessfully, in the end) 
to bar the event on the grounds that it qualified as “public.”81 Todd  
79. Interview with Larry Wolk, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & 
Env’t (May 15, 2014). 
80. Tourism is a significant element of the retail marijuana market, as was 
indicated in a recent study of consumer marijuana demand commiss-
ioned by the Department of Revenue. Miles K. Light et al., 
Market Size and Demand for Marijuana in Colorado 21–26 
(2014) (estimating total visitor demand as approximately nine metric 
tons).  
81. Ray Mark Rinaldi, CSO Cannabis Concerts Now Invitation Only, 
Denver Post, May 14, 2014, at A10.  
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Mitchem, of O.penVAPE, faced a similar problem recently. His com-
pany wanted to host a Vape and Vinyasa event at the company’s 
headquarters, focusing on yoga and introducing prospective customers 
to O.penVAPE’s vaporized cannabis product. City officials forbade 
the event on the grounds that it, too, was “public.”82 One result of 
such rulings may be to steer users toward more dangerous, less super-
vised forms of consumption.  
Indoor use presents further challenges for the state beyond the 
definition of “public.” First, the Indoor Clean Air Act prevents the 
use of smoked products inside establishments like businesses, restau-
rants, public buildings, and so on. In addition, the use of marijuana 
can have second-hand intoxicating effects for nonsmoking patrons or 
even first-responders dispatched to a complaint.  
One path forward may well be modified smoking clubs that rely 
on smokeless or smoke-limited alternatives with cutting-edge ventila-
tion systems or open-air smoking spaces. Additionally, allowing closed 
events where customers or attendees understand that marijuana use 
will occur can provide a middle ground for Colorado residents and 
tourists. 
As reports continue to surface about people using edibles and 
landing in emergency rooms, the government will need to implement 
realistic changes that seek to redirect incentives. Striking a balance 
between public health and safety on the one hand and personal 
prerogatives on the other is essential, and the rules for edibles, tour-
ism, and public use have yet to get the incentives right. 
Conclusion: Is Colorado Succeeding—and Why? 
Much of this Article has praised the innovation, professionalism, 
competence, leadership, and execution of the implementation of mari-
juana legalization in Colorado. The broad success of the state in put-
ting into effect a policy that had no true precedent was a difficult 
task, and Colorado largely did well.  
As I noted, shortcomings and challenges exist, and they cannot be 
overlooked or dismissed. Just as important, however, is that the state 
government has met the most basic standard of success: it has done 
what Amendment Sixty-Four instructed it to do. Colorado has effect-
ively created regulatory and administrative apparatuses that facilitate 
the legal retail marijuana market.  
On January 1, 2014, retail marijuana dispensaries opened. 
Consumers from Colorado were able to purchase state-regulated 
 
82. Mitchem’s response, though certainly one of disappointment, was to say 
that the approach moving forward should be, “Let’s guide this thing; 
let’s work with the city to get it right,” as opposed to simply fighting. 
Interview with Todd Mitchem, Chief Revenue Officer, O.penVAPE 
(May 16, 2014). 
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marijuana. Businesses are thriving. Tourism around the marijuana 
industry is growing. New license applications for marijuana enterprises 
are being readied and evaluated. The market is expanding in compli-
ance with the regulatory features of the new system. Through a series 
of legislative, executive, and administrative actions, the state has 
allowed product to come to market; ensured that monitoring and 
enforcement process are in place and functioning; collected revenue 
from marijuana sales; and sought to build, maintain, and improve the 
ability of the state to continue to regulate the market effectively. 
None of this would be possible in a state that failed to implement the 
law in an effective and successful way. 
What were the elements of successful implementation? First, pol-
icy implementation cannot be successful without effective leadership. 
That is true in any area of policy, but particularly so for marijuana 
legalization—a unique and complex issue. State leaders—from the 
governor to agency heads to legislators, as well as a variety of actors 
throughout the system—did something nearly unheard of in an era of 
policy gridlock and political polarization. They set aside their personal 
views and coalesced around the idea that Colorado wanted legalized 
marijuana, and it was their duty to make that a reality. 
What this leadership amounted to was a commitment to good 
government. That is, many state leaders pushed to ensure that agen-
cies, officials, and state employees had the support to do what was 
necessary to implement the law. Support from political leadership 
may seem tangential to the wonkish work of implementation. Yet 
those serving in the trenches of state bureaucracy know well the 
barriers to success created by political opposition and administrative 
foot-dragging. Colorado effectively avoided both. 
Yes, opposition to the policy still exists, but stakeholders with 
diverse views—on both sides—took cues from the governor and others 
and worked to make implementation a success. To be sure, it was not 
a Kumbaya moment across Colorado, but the maturity and profess-
ionalism shown by both sides facilitated what has been an impressive 
implementation rollout. 
Another element of Colorado’s implementation success is inclusive 
planning. Amendment Sixty-Four required rapid construction of an 
elaborate regulatory apparatus, in a complicated environment. The 
state relied on task forces and working groups to prepare and 
ultimately implement the change—groups that were responsible for 
many of the regulatory and institutional measures the state under-
took. 
The success of task forces and working groups grew not simply 
out of their existence but also from their missions and memberships. 
Each was given a specific jurisdiction and set of goals. Vague missions 
or wide-ranging jurisdictions can be short paths to gridlock. By 
focusing each group, the state made success more attainable. As a 
result, each task force met its expectations and did so on schedule. 
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Organizers also made sure that groups’ memberships included 
diverse perspectives. This approach ensured that issues received a 
balanced airing and that debates (and ultimately outcomes) were not 
driven by preexisting arrangements. Instead, diversity in membership 
facilitated compromise and cooperation.  
The use of broadly inclusive task forces is certainly not unheard of 
in state government. What is distinctive is the extent of Colorado’s 
commitment to this technique. The state’s consistent and repeated 
reliance on task forces and working groups signals a real interest in 
deliberative and cooperative implementation. It also generates 
political support for outcomes, even giving opponents a stake in the 
process. It thus makes for good politics and good policymaking—both 
of which help implementation. 
Competent management has also helped greatly. Part of that 
management came from changes within the Department of Revenue, 
in terms of both institutional organization and personnel. The state 
legislature and the department responded both to the recommenda-
tions of the Implementation Task Force and the 2013 medical mari-
juana audit by reorganizing oversight of marijuana enforcement and 
creating a new division—the MED—to address retail marijuana. 
Agency leaders also hired new staff and promoted talented individuals 
from within the division.  
Although bureaucratic reorganizations are easy to dismiss as 
merely moving the boxes on flow diagrams, they can have a profound 
impact on effectiveness. In Colorado, the result has been a regulatory 
regime that has met the deadlines required by statute and the consti-
tution; has implemented many of the recommendations of the Imple-
mentation Task Force; and, as a result, has positioned both the 
market and the MED to capitalize on the experience of existing mar-
ket actors and meet new demand from retail consumers. Despite some 
regulatory shortcomings, the MED’s managerial effectiveness signaled 
to consumers, producers, advocates, opponents, and the general public 
that the new division, unlike its predecessor, was both a credible and 
competent administrative institution.  
Another powerful contributor to implementation success has been 
the state’s focus on effective communication and coordination. Some 
of the biggest government failures in the nation’s history have come 
about because of failures to communicate and coordinate (e.g., Hurri-
cane Katrina). Colorado has gone to great lengths to avoid such fail-
ings in the context of marijuana policy. 
The task-force and working-group model has contributed import-
antly to the effective exchange of information. Many people in indus-
try, people in government, and even opponents of Amendment Sixty-
Four reported that although their specific interests did not always 
become policy, they felt they had been listened to and that the state 
often—though not always—kept them informed. Communication be-
tween the Department of Revenue and stakeholders on both sides was 
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not perfect, and the department should seek to identify weaknesses in 
information flows. However, the two-way flow of information has been 
substantial and beneficial. 
The governor’s office has spearheaded communication efforts, 
hiring a marijuana policy coordinator—effectively a marijuana czar—
who works internally and externally to identify policy and implement-
ation challenges, communication breakdowns, and other needs across 
the state. The office works closely with those involved in implementa-
tion as well as stakeholders outside government. Colorado’s use of an 
official liaison, particularly one housed in the executive office, helps 
break down barriers between agencies and actors, which barriers often 
plague policy implementation.  
Finally, implementation has been effective because the state has 
been committed to flexible administration. Regulators, legislators, and 
other officials see implementation of marijuana policy as a fluid pro-
cess in which early efforts must be continually reassessed and, if need 
be, revised to ensure effectiveness.  
The state has shown its flexible approach in many ways. First, 
state regulatory decision-making processes, at times, began without 
draft rules and instead commenced with an open discussion of what 
effective regulation should accomplish. Second, the state has sought to 
be proactive in the design of rules, using big data, enforcement and 
compliance knowhow, and communication with industry to help make 
its policies consistent with the latest information. These efforts make 
the state willing to respond to new information to produce new poli-
cies. Third, the state has been willing to learn from the past. Thus 
far, the state has been willing to engage in regulatory lookback to 
address implementation problems that it either missed or that arise as 
the market matures. 
To say that early implementation has proven successful is not to 
say it is perfect or future-proof. Nor is it to say the policy is without 
problems. State leaders should use data in the future to evaluate fully 
the impact of marijuana legalization on society in the context of 
crime, health, addiction, public safety, and so on. Because legalization 
is experimental, the state should be committed to understanding what 
effects—positive and negative—are associated with the policy change. 
Effective implementation should not mask the need for high-quality, 
robust, systematic policy analysis, which is as important to good 
government as implementation itself.  
Still, a strong launch, built on a capable and flexible administra-
tive infrastructure, gives Colorado a leg up as events unfold. If the 
state can maintain the flexibility, administrative competence, inclu-
siveness, coordination, and sense of mission that have marked legaliz-
ation’s rollout, it will be well positioned to continue its success for 
some time.  
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Appendix 
Colorado’s Regulatory Recipe for Retail Marijuana: 
Six Essential Ingredients 
1. Seed-to-Sale Tracking System 
Part of the legislative mandate surrounding the implementation of 
Amendment Sixty-Four, also recommended by the Implementation 
Task Force, was to use a state-of-the-art “inventory control and 
tracking” system. In response, the Colorado Department of Revenue 
promulgated Rule R 309, outlining the new system, formally called 
Marijuana Inventory Tracking Solution (“MITS”) and often referred 
to as the seed-to-sale tracking system. 
MITS is a web-based system that interfaces with a system of 
plant-based tags that rely on a radio frequency identification system. 
Every plant in the market must be individually tagged and tracked as 
it moves through the commercial growth and distribution chain.83  
The system is widely considered one of the most advanced in the 
marijuana industry and is used to track product, limit diversion, im-
prove regulatory compliance, and discourage improper market behav-
ior.  
The system, though technologically advanced, operates in a 
straightforward way. Plants are tagged in their initial planting. As 
each plant moves through the cultivation process, the tag stays with 
it from stage to stage. Eventually, flower is harvested and plants are 
combined to make batches. Cultivation facilities batch product by 
combining MITS tag numbers so that the product in any container or 
retail product can be traced by the batch number to see which plants 
are included. Medical and retail plants use the same technology, but 
each type requires a different tag to distinguish which market a given 
plant is cultivated to serve (per Rule R 304(B)(1)).84 
The MITS system helps the state in a multitude of ways. In 
general, it does not add large regulatory costs to an operation: tags 
are relatively cheap, and businesses are incentivized to use systems to 
track and manage product as part of good business practice.85 
 
83. The distinction here is an important one. The MITS system applies only 
to commercial production and distribution of marijuana, both medical 
and retail. It does not extend to homegrows or caregivers. 
84. See Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2 (2013). The rule on point here notes 
that cultivators “shall maintain either physical or virtual separation of 
the facilities, marijuana plants, and marijuana inventory. Record-
keeping for the business operations and labeling of product must enable 
the Division and relevant local jurisdictions to clearly distinguish the 
inventories and business transactions of the Medical Marijuana Business 
from the Retail Marijuana Establishment.” Id. § 212-2.304(B)(1). 
85. Some complaints have arisen over the costs of tags and the lack of alter-
native tagging companies. The state has contracted with a single com-
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Regulators and businesses have a general idea of how much plants of 
a given strain will produce and can crosscheck expectations with 
actual harvest. The system offers the state the ability to track pro-
duct in ways that far surpass product tracking in most other com-
modity markets in the U.S.  
Careful tracking reduces the chance of diversion, one of the 
biggest risks to the legal marijuana market. Diversion of product can 
empower illegal operations, undermine the goals of Amendment Sixty-
Four, and reduce tax revenue to the state. At the same time, diver-
sion could cause the federal government to determine that the Colo-
rado experiment is a failure and intervene. 
The MITS system also allows the state to collect and analyze 
data that help improve and streamline enforcement efforts and com-
pliance investigations. In interviews, Marijuana Enforcement Division 
(MED) leaders noted that analysis of MITS data can show where 
weaknesses exist in the system, as well as which producers are most at 
risk of compliance violations. For example, if a given firm keeps pro-
ducing unexpectedly low harvest numbers, or if batches are yielding 
lower quantities than they should, MED can target enforcement not 
just to the firm level but to the specific process in a firm. In this way, 
the MITS data help investigators identify possible compliance prob-
lems and, where necessary, resolve them in a cost-effective way.  
Advances in both technology and data management and analysis 
allow for streamlined enforcement that can increase effectiveness and 
lower costs. Lewis Koski, the MED director, noted that one benefit of 
the comprehensive nature of the MITS system is that it allows the 
division to “switch from being reactive and implement risk-based 
proactive assessments.”86 
In many ways, the MITS system is the backbone of Colorado’s 
regulatory structure governing legalized marijuana. If effective, it 
helps businesses and regulators guard against shady practices, while 
helping keep at bay a federal government that is closely watching 
enforcement and compliance. 
2. Vertical Integration 
The structure of the retail marijuana market in Colorado is 
heavily regulated. The Implementation Task Force recommended a 
vertical integration model for the industry. Vertical integration means 
that the supply chain for a given retail enterprise is maintained 
entirely within that same business. Specifically, a marijuana dispens-
ary—retail or medical—must also cultivate the product. Reflecting 
 
pany for MITS supplies and technology, which means price variation 
does not exist. 
86. Interview with Lewis Koski, Director of Marijuana Enforcement, State 
of Colorado (May 13, 2014). 
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the importance of this regulatory structure, vertical integration is part 
of the first recommendation in the Implementation Task Force report: 
“Under this model, cultivation, processing and manufacturing, and 
retail sales must be a common enterprise under common ownership.”87 
The report also recommends that the vertical-integration model 
adopt a “70/30 rule,” which requires an enterprise to sell at least 70 
percent of what it produces in its own retail outlets. It can purchase 
from other enterprises up to 30 percent of the product that it sells in 
retail outlets. Similarly, an enterprise can sell no more than 30 per-
cent of its product to other enterprises. The goal of the model is “to 
regulate the adult-use marijuana industry and inhibit the diversion of 
legal marijuana, both within Colorado and to neighboring states.”88 
The state heeded these recommendations. The Department of 
Revenue promulgated Rule R 402, “Retail Marijuana Sales: General 
Limitations and Prohibited Acts.”89 This rule formalizes the 70/30 
vertical integration model, precisely as recommended by the Imple-
mentation Task Force, including various reporting requirements that 
were included in Recommendation 1.1.90 Rule R 402 specifically 
eschews the state-run model, which the task force considered and 
rejected.91  
However, vertical integration and the associated 70/30 rule were 
made temporary in the state—generally expiring by October 1, 2014.92 
In part, the temporary nature of the rule and particularly the timing 
of its expiration came about as a result of political compromise rather 
than policy planning. Nonetheless, the nature of the regulatory action 
had the clear benefit of reducing the pressure state regulators faced as 
they rolled out policy changes and a new regulatory apparatus. Staged 
or tiered rollouts are often employed as a means of decreasing press-
ure, confusion, and sheer workload that a government agency faces. 
This is particularly true of a policy area as new as marijuana 
legalization. At the outset, vertical integration makes for a less comp-
licated system, aiding regulators as they learn the ropes. During a 
period of low or limited regulatory capacity, a larger, more diverse 
market may have meant MED would need to hire more staff, initiate 
more enforcement actions, and likely face many false positives in 
investigating compliance. By contrast, an effort to scale up the 
market after regulators gain more experience will likely be more cost 
effective. In fact, the wild-west-style, under-regulated medical mari-
 
87. Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 16. 
88. Id. at 17.  
89. Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2.402 (2013).  
90. Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 16.  
91. Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2.402 (2013). 
92. Id.  
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juana market in Colorado from 2000 to 2009 served as a prime ex-
ample of the costs (monetary and non-monetary) that can accrue 
when market expansion is unchecked during a period of limited reg-
ulatory capacity. In that respect, vertical integration is an example of 
policy learning on the part of state officials. 
3. Temporary Barriers to New Entry; Preferences for Existing Producers 
As retail marijuana became legal in Colorado, the state granted 
legal preferences for existing medical marijuana enterprises to take the 
lead in expanding the market. Amendment Sixty-Four itself requires 
that “in any competitive [licensing] application process the Depart-
ment [of Revenue] shall have as a primary consideration whether an 
applicant has prior experience producing or distributing marijuana or 
marijuana products pursuant to” existing medical provisions.93 
Amendment Sixty-Four also reduces the fees that medical marijuana 
enterprises must pay in order to enter the retail market, relative to 
the fees that will be charged to new entrants in the future. 
Preference for existing medical enterprises did not end with the 
text of the amendment. The Implementation Task Force recom-
mended that the state “provide for a grace period of one year that 
would limit new application for adult-use marijuana license to medical 
marijuana license holders in good standing or applicants that had an 
application pending with the Medical Marijuana Enforcement Division 
prior to December 10, 2012.”94 
This recommendation was generally accepted by the state legis-
lature, which codified it into law and spelled out the timing and terms 
of the moratorium on new entrants into the market. The legislature 
also set out licensing options for existing medical producers. Those 
three options were (1) remaining in medical, (2) transitioning fully to 
retail, or (3) holding dual licenses.95 MED promulgated rules reinforc-
ing preferences for existing medical marijuana producers and detailing 
and clarifying the rules by which initial licensing would occur.  
In some regulatory contexts, carve-outs for existing industry par-
ticipants would raise eyebrows about collusion or preferential treat-
ment. In the marijuana industry, and especially among prospective 
market entrants, dissent certainly arose. Prospective entrants, hoping 
to jump into what some expected would become a booming industry, 
were denied. Although that exclusion was temporary (blunting 
criticism slightly), the policy advantaged firms that were able to move 
into the new market right out of the gate. The regulatory decision to 
limit the initial size of the market made clear choices about the 
distribution of those advantages.   
93. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16. 
94. Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 16. 
95. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-43.4-104(1) (2014). 
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Despite those concerns from prospective market participants, the 
decision was administratively astute for a few reasons. The Imple-
mentation Task Force explained that the preference recognizes and re-
wards “prior experience and compliance history . . . [and] recognizes 
this advantage and builds on the experience of existing medical mari-
juana licensees, who have operated within a similar regulatory mo-
del.”96 
There were additional benefits, as well. First, the special 
treatment of existing producers gave state regulators some breathing 
room to get the regulatory model right. The Implementation Task 
Force acknowledged this point, explaining that the preference “allows 
the state licensing authority to manage the transition and expansion 
from medical to adult-use marijuana in a predictable, orderly, and 
controlled manner, reducing the likelihood of federal scrutiny of Colo-
rado’s new adult-use marijuana industry.”97 This was an important 
consideration. The expansion of the market was quite risky and regu-
lators knew that failure would have implications across Colorado and 
at the national level. Regulators also realized they had a lot to learn, 
and an incubation period would involve on-the-job training with a 
steep learning curve. 
Second, the moratorium on new entrants to the market allowed 
MED to deal largely with industry actors whom they already knew 
and had worked with (successfully or otherwise). Having institutional 
knowledge about every retail marijuana actor helped MED better 
identify actors who might need extra scrutiny. It thus allowed more-
informed oversight of enforcement and compliance during the rollout 
of the new program. As the launch of the Affordable Care Act’s 
federal exchange website has shown, early implementation efforts can 
be quite rocky, and any efforts to reduce risks of problems or failure 
are helpful for regulators and administrators. 
Third, advantaging medical marijuana providers reduced the 
paperwork pressure the MED would have faced—an issue that had 
plagued the Medical Marijuana Enforcement Division (MED’s prede-
cessor) and caused substantial industry discontent. While paperwork 
delays may seem like a minor aspect of administrative procedure, they 
are often a magnet for citizen complaints (think of the DMV). In ad-
dition, Amendment Sixty-Four required very strict turnaround times 
for license application processing, background check procedures, and 
so forth, and the ability of the agency to reduce its initial procedural 
burden was critical.98  
Ultimately, the moratorium on new retail-market entrants may 
well have been one of the most important features of the new system.  
96. Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 17–18.  
97. Id. at 18. 
98. Id.  
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It helped improve the initial administrative capacity of the new 
agency, easing its entry into a new policy domain and thus contribut-
ing to early implementation success. 
4. Limits on Quantities Purchased 
Not all regulatory decisions or administrative choices are grand in 
scale, and even smaller-scale decisions can have serious implications. 
MED promulgated rules limiting the quantity of marijuana that could 
be sold in a single transaction. Rule R 402(D) prohibits retail stores 
from selling more than one ounce of marijuana to a Colorado resident 
and more than one-quarter ounce of marijuana to a visitor from out of 
state.99 Photo identification requirements allow dispensaries to disting-
uish between Coloradans and others.100 
These limits were an effective way to maintain order, limit illegal 
redistribution from dispensary-purchased marijuana, and thereby fur-
ther discourage diversion. Quantity limits were thus a sensible effort 
to help address the worry that people from other states—especially 
those bordering Colorado—would purchase marijuana in bulk, return 
home with it, and resell it. 
What Rule R 402(D) does not prevent is an individual going to 
multiple shops in a single day and purchasing up to the limit at 
each—a term often referred to informally as “smurfing.” One possible 
means of combating such behavior is to create purchasing registries 
like the one the federal government implemented for pseudoephedrine 
(to discourage methamphetamines production). However, Amendment 
Sixty-Four § 5(c) specifically prohibits the creation and use of a regis-
try for retail marijuana (though a registry does exist for medical).101 
With its hands tied by constitutional language, how can the state 
combat smurfing? The state maintains that possessing more than 
specified amounts of marijuana at any one time is unlawful for Colo-
rado residents and for visitors.102 Limits on purchase are an effective 
step toward preventing the hoarding of product and smurfing; how-
ever, the state should use any available data in the future to try to 
quantify whether such behaviors are occurring and should work with 
industry and law enforcement to learn the best ways to prevent it.  
99. Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2.402 (2013). 
100. Id. § 212-2.404 (2013).  
101. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(c). (“In order to ensure that individ-
ual privacy is protected . . . the Department shall not require a 
consumer to provide a retail marijuana store with personal information 
other than the government-issued identification to determine the con-
sumer’s age, and a retail marijuana store shall not be required to acquire 
and record personal information about consumers other than informa-
tion typically acquired in a financial transaction conducted at a retail 
liquor store.”). 
102. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-406 (2014). 
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5. Video Surveillance  
The MED issued Rule R 306 requiring all retail marijuana estab-
lishments to maintain comprehensive video surveillance systems.103 
The rule applies to cultivation and processing sites and retail dispens-
aries. The rule in effect requires every inch of marijuana-related oper-
ation spaces to be recorded. It even requires that all entry points be 
videotaped in grow rooms where lighting is turned off.104 
The rules surrounding video surveillance are comprehensive and 
precautionary. There are multiple reasons for them. As with many of 
the other regulations, surveillance is intended to prevent diversion. In 
the context of grow operations, diversion can happen internally 
(company employees might remove product and repurpose or resell it) 
or externally (thieves might steal plants or other product). The sur-
veillance system helps investigators apprehend those involved in thefts 
or other diversion activities, and the existence of video surveillance 
can deter those considering theft or diversion. 
In interviews, MED leadership noted another reason for compre-
hensive video surveillance. Regulators expected that the legal mari-
juana market in Colorado would likely be cash-only for quite some 
time. Financial institutions are reluctant to deal with marijuana-
related businesses, fearing legal intervention under the Controlled 
Substances Act and other federal laws and regulations. As a result, 
MED regulators understood that marijuana-related enterprises would 
likely be handling large sums of cash, a tempting target for theft. This 
kind of crime, too, is something that expansive surveillance could help 
deter. 
The rules surrounding video surveillance were innovative in design 
and multipurpose in nature. They will not stop every illegal action in 
marijuana-related businesses, any more than surveillance in banks, 
shopping malls, or casinos stops every crime. However, the thought-
fulness of the multiple ways in which surveillance can improve preven-
tion and detection of bad behavior reflects the careful regulatory work 
of the MED—and the influence of the law enforcement background 
from which several MED staff members hail.105 
In a related example of administrative innovation, the MED also 
designed video surveillance for its own purposes. Because the mari-
juana industry is largely cash based, the MED takes in large sums of 
tax revenues in cash. Though largely unavoidable, cash inflow creates 
risks for the Department of Revenue and for the enforcement division. 
As a result, video surveillance and security at MED headquarters are 
 
103. Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2.306 (2013). 
104. Id.  
105. For example, Lewis Koski, the director of MMED, is a former police 
officer and chief of investigations at MMED. 
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substantial. Signs at the door indicate that armed peace officers are 
on site. Koski and Kammerzell indicated that their own facility is 
heavily monitored, much like grow and retail facilities are.  
The Department of Revenue has enforcement power over four 
major industries in Colorado: alcohol, tobacco, marijuana, and gam-
ing. The last of these proved to be quite helpful in this context. En-
forcement officials at the department asked gambling institutions to 
provide advice on how to design what is essentially a “cash count 
room” on site in order to prevent theft—another example of Colo-
rado’s creative regulatory thinking. 
6. Marijuana Revenue and Funding Distribution106 
The medical marijuana system that existed prior to the legaliza-
tion of retail marijuana was fraught with financing problems. The 
revenue streams to the Medical Marijuana Enforcement Division were 
uncertain and often fluctuated. The division spent money quite 
quickly, and enforcement depended on the sometimes precarious pro-
cess of legislative appropriations. Realizing that such funding prob-
lems caused administrative and enforcement headaches, legalization 
brought with it a series of changes in the financing of the new Mari-
juana Enforcement Division. 
Amendment Sixty-Four dealt only in broad, undetailed terms 
with the way taxation and fees would work in the state, setting limits 
on licensing and application fees and charging the legislature with 
proposing a tax structure. To set up the tax framework, the legisla-
ture passed H.B. 13-1318,107 which placed Proposition AA on the No-
vember 2013 ballot.108  
In outline, the taxation of retail marijuana is as follows. Localities 
can opt to set local sales taxes on marijuana. The currently existing 
2.9 percent sales tax (on medical and now retail) would continue. The 
state imposed a 15 percent excise tax on unprocessed marijuana. Ad-
ditionally, it imposed a special 10 percent marijuana sales tax on 
transactions (point-of-sale).109 
 
106. Although the structure of tax revenue and financing did not emerge 
from rulemaking at the agency level, it remains an important aspect of 
the regulatory apparatus surrounding marijuana policy in Colorado. 
107. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-28.8-101 (2013). 
108. Proposition AA asked voters to approve what amounted to a tax in-
crease, as it created new taxes on the purchase of retail marijuana. H.B. 
13-1318, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013). Under the 
“Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights” in the Colorado Constitution, any increase 
in taxes must be approved by a statewide ballot initiative. Formally, the 
language notes that “other limits on district revenue, spending, and debt 
may be weakened only by future voter approval.” Colo. Const. art. X, 
§ 20.  
109. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-28.8-202 (2013). 
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The initiative itself and the authorizing language in HB 13-1318 
required specific distribution schemes for marijuana revenue. For ex-
ample, the first $40 million collected through the 15 percent excise tax 
is to be used for public school construction.110 In addition, 15 percent 
of the revenue collected through the special 10 percent marijuana 
sales tax will be allocated to local governments that have marijuana 
dispensaries within their jurisdiction, based on the percentage of 
revenue that each jurisdiction collects.111 A substantial portion of 
remaining revenue will be used for enforcement (in large part to fund 
the MED). This provides the MED with a stable and consistent 
stream of funding, separate from the annual legislative appropriations 
process—a critical improvement over the prior funding model for 
medical marijuana oversight. 
The financing law also allows funds remaining after MED’s set-
aside to be divided and distributed for other, related purposes. In 
2014, the state did just that. The legislature passed, and governor 
signed, SB 14-215,112 which specifies “other purposes” for fiscal 2014–
2015. The law includes more than a dozen specific appropriations 
from the Marijuana Tax Cash Fund.113 Money flowed to schools, sub-
stance abuse treatment, public health education campaigns, and law 
enforcement training, among other things. 
The structure of revenue and funding distribution is laudable be-
cause it serves important policy and political needs, among them 
schools, public health, and public safety—areas with near-universal 
support in the electorate. The funding system also acknowledges that 
the legalization of retail (and even medical) marijuana can create 
some new public policy needs. Funding those needs through the 
annual appropriations process builds in a way for the legislature to 
respond to an ever-changing policy space in a flexible way. 
Finally, the structure of the funding system carries political 
benefits. By responding to the needs of the law enforcement, public 
safety, and public health communities, the state was able to build 
goodwill—and a stake—among constituencies that are traditionally 
opposed to legalization. State and local officials working in public 
 
110. Id. at § 305. 
111. Id. at § 203(a)(1). 
112. Id. at § 501.  
113. Under the new law, fees collected through the licensing process would be 
deposited into the currently existing Marijuana Cash Fund and be used 
to fund the Department of Revenue’s regulatory and enforcement activi-
ties. Id. All other tax revenues from marijuana would be deposited into 
the new Marijuana Tax Cash Fund. The Marijuana Tax Cash Fund 
would finance school construction and local government, MED enforce-
ment costs, and other activities. Id. 
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health and law enforcement told me they were pleased that the state 
acknowledged their need for funding to address new policy concerns. 
The purpose of distributing marijuana revenue is not and should 
not be to buy off skeptics. Instead, however, new revenues can play a 
valuable role in buffering legalization’s impact on those who oppose it 
or who bear its costs—and political judgment plays an indispensable 
role in identifying those persons and weighing their claims. In that 
important sense, in order for the new policy to be effective and stable, 
politics is an essential component of implementation. By providing 
political shock absorbers, Colorado’s marijuana revenue system builds 
in sensitivity to the complex and shifting social realities within the 
state. 
 
